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THE FUNCTION OF THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
AS PROTECTORS OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
OSMOND K. FRAENKEL*
The judicial power of the United States lies in a Supreme Court and such in-
ferior courts as Congress may create, and the jurisdiction of these courts extends
to all cases arising under the Constitution.1 Since the Constitution, with its amend-
ments, contains many provisions guaranteeing civil rights to individuals, it is evident
that the federal courts have an important role to play in giving meaning and efficacy
to civil liberties.
By virtue of the federal character of our government this is a dual role: the
courts are concerned with violations of civil rights by both the states and the
Federal Government. Despite the absence of specific authority in the Constitution,
the Supreme Court early began to exercise the right to review such violations where
it concluded they had infringed rights constitutionally guaranteed. This power
has been used increasingly in recent years in cases affecting civil liberties. The
Supreme Court's function in this field in reviewing state decisions has been fre-
quently and fully discussed. By now, even though the Court's action in a particular
case may still cause surprise, its function is generally understood. Less well known,
however, is the role of the lower federal courts in dealing with such liberties.
Although the Constitution clearly authorizes Congress to invest the lower fed-
eral courts with jurisdiction over all cases arising under it, that body did not effec-
tively do this for nearly a century. In the original Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress
gave no express power to the inferior federal courts which were then established
to determine controversies arising under the Constitution. Such power was given,
of course, as part of the grant of jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, but
this was limited to controversies involving more than $5o0.2 In i8oi Congress for
the first time granted the direct power to deal with cases arising under the Con-
stitution, regardless of citizenship, but almost immediately withdrew it,' and it was
not until 1875 that the power was definitely made part of the federal judicial system.4
The application of the new provision was, however, limited by the requirement
*Author: THE SACco-VANzEhrT CASE (1931); OUtR CIVIL LwmI3EIEs (1944); Editor, TIE CURSE OF
BIGNESS, MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF MR. JusTcE BRANDEIS (1935). Author of legal articles in various
publications. Member, Board of Directors of American Civil Liberties Union; Chairman, Hearings
Board of Department of Welfare of City of New York.
1 U. S. CoNsT. Art. III, §§i and 2.
'Act of Sept. 24, 1789, C. 20, §9; I STAT. 76.
'Act of Feb. 13, x8ox, c. 4, §11; 2 STAT. 89, repealed 2 STAT. X32 (iSos).
'Act of March 3, 875, c. 137, 5i; 18 STAT. 47, now 36 S-AT. xo9i (9), as amended, 28 U. S. C.
§41(1) (1940).
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that a monetary claim be involved. In 1887 the amount was increased from $500
to $2,ooo; 5 since 1911 it has stood at $3,000.6
With respect to certain limited constitutional issues, however, Congress gave the
federal courts jurisdiction without regard either to diversity of citizenship or to the
amount involved as early as 1871. These provisions were part of the various civil
rights laws by which Congress sought to implement the post-Civil War amendments.
They dealt primarily with the denial of equal protection,7 but extended also to in-
dude denial of any federally guaranteed right "under color" of any state law or cus-
tom.8 At the same time Congress permitted the removal to a federal court of any state
criminal prosecution when it threatened to deny "equal civil rights." '9 This last
provision has had very limited effectiveness because of the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the law as requiring denial of such-rights by a state statute.'0 The most
extensive development of federal jurisdiction in relation to state action has come in
connection with that provision which deals with action taken under color of state law.
The federal courts have been concerned also with the denial of civil rights by
private persons. Here they are restricted by Supreme Court rulings to the effect that
many rights are protected by the United States Constitution only against infringe-
ment by state action, and redress for wrongs done by private persons can be had
only under state law. Hence, attempts by Congress to give federal courts juris-
diction over suits against innkeepers or carriers accused of discrimination based on
race were held unconstitutional." ' Since the Thirteenth Amendment, which forbids
slavery, is broader in scope than the Fourteenth, which guarantees equal protection
of the laws, direct federal action can be taken against private persons who practice
peonage'2
Whether Congress can make lynching by private persons a federal crime is open
to serious question. Where state officers are involved federal jurisdiction is clear;
otherwise it is doubtful. 3 Political considerations have, however, prevented the
enactment of any law of this kind under which the limits of federal power might
be tested.
'Act of March 3, 1887, c. 373, §1; 24 STAT. 552 (1887), 36 STAT. 109i ('gIl) as amended, 28r
U. S. C. §41(x) (1940).
*Act of March 3, 1911, cc. 231, 324; 36 STAT. io91 (I91I), as amended, 2.8 U. S. C. §4Y1(1) (1940).
7Act of April 20, 1871, C. 22 §92, 6; 17 STAT. 13, 15 (1871); 36 STAT. 1092 (1911), as amended,
28 U. S. C. §41(12), (13), (1940), and RFv. STAT. ig8o (1875), 8 U. S. C. §47 (1940); Act of March
11 1875, c. 14, §4, 18 STAT. 336, Pt. 111 (1875), 8 U. S. C. §§44, 45 (1940).
8 Act of April 20, 1871, C. 22, §1; 17 STAT. 13 (1871), 36 STAT. i092 (1911), as amended, 28
U. S. C. §41(14) (940).
9Act of May 31, 1870, c. 114, §§16, x8; 16 STAT. 144; now 36 STAT. 1096 (1911), 28 U. S. C.
§74 (1940).
'o Kqntucky v. Powers, 201 U. S. I (19o6).
" Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883).
"
2United States v. Reynolds, 235 U. S. 133 (1914).
'
5 See Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945); MLToN R. KoNviTS, TE CONSTTUrION AND
CIVIL Ric:Ts 74-90 (947). But .ee Ex parte Riggins, 134 Fed. 404 (N. D. Ala. 1904), appeal dis-
missed, 199 U. S. 547 (1905), where an indictment of private persons was held good because they
were charged with the lynching of a Negro while in custody of state officials under charges of crime.
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The federal courts may also proceed directly against violators of rights secured by
the United States Constitution. Among the rights so included are the right to vote
for members of Congress, 4 to enter public lands,' to give information with regard
to a federal offense,' to be protected from violence while in custody of a federal
officer, 7 and to travel from state to state.'"
Federal courts, of course, are also concerned with the denial of civil rights by
the federal government itself-in the interpretation of statutes challenged as un-
constitutional, the review of administrative action, or the exercise of the judicial
function itself. We shall not concern ourselves, however, with these problems. The
basic substantive questions are the same in the review of both federal and state
action. Special procedural problems have arisen, however, in the review of state
action, because of the delicate nature of the relation between the Federal Government
and the states. These problems are not always thoroughly understood and to some
extent the rules underlying them require revision.
Challenge of state action in the federal courts grew, at first, mostly out of post-
Civil War discrimination against the Negroes' rights to vote, to serve on juries, and
generally to become first-class citizens-rights which have still to be fought for.
During the last two decades federal jurisdiction has been invoked in aid of other
rights, such as freedom of religion and speech. This development has resulted
from decisions of the Supreme Court by which most of the specific guarantees of
the federal Bill of Rights have been siphoned into the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.'
Practically all forms of judicial proceeding have been invoked in efforts to re-
dress grievances: actions at law for damages, suits in equity to enjoin the enforce-
ment of some law or other expected state action, suits for declaratory judgment to
define threatened rights, applications for writs of habeas corpus to challenge de-
tention, and criminal prosecutions.
The Supreme Court has had occasion to consider each of these procedures and
has announced certain limitations on the effectiveness of most of them. The most
serious of these limitations requires application for relief to state courts before
address to a federal court-and how often, then, is it futile to try to get action of
any kind from the federal court! This particular difficulty arises most often in
the field of habeas corpus.
"Ex parte Yarbrough, iso U. S. 65s (1884); United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941).
1 1 United States v. Waddell, 112 U. S. 76 (1884).
6 Motes v. United States, 178 U. S. 458 (igoo).
"1Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263 (z892).
" See Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (U. S. 1868); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 28x (1920);
Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 16o (1941).
1 9 See OsMO D K. FRAENKELr OUR CIVIL LiBRTIsS 46-50 (1944); Wilkinson, The Federal Bill of
Rights and the r4th Amendment, 26 GEo. L. J. 439 (r938); Fraenkel, One Hundred and Fifty Years
of the Bill of Rights, 23 MINN. L. REv. 719 (1939). And see Adamson v. California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672(1947).
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TBE WuT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The writ of habeas corpus may be used to challenge the propriety of state action
on constitutional grounds so basic as to vitiate the conviction attacked. Last-min-
ute attempts to review state convictions by habeas corpus in a federal court failed
to save Leo Frank2' and Sacco and Vanzetti, 2' but did save a group of Arkansas
Negroes who asserted that their trial had been dominated by mob violence.22
The most frequent recent use of the writ has been to explore claims that the
convicted defendant has been denied counsel. Ever since the Supreme Court
ruled that denial of counsel voids a conviction by a federal court, whatever the cir-
cumstances,23 attempts have been made, without avail, to obtain a like ruling with
regard to state convictions.24  But while the absolute protection of the Sixth Amend-
ment does not extend to defendants in state courts, the Supreme Court has ruled
that due process of law does require that a state give a defendant ample opportunity
to meet an accusation, and has frequently found in particular situations circumstances
which make the assignment of counsel essential to the substance of the hearing
required by due process.25 Direct recourse to the federal courts has rarely been
permitted.20
The Hawk cases27 indicate the difficulty that confronts any one who tries to get
relief from the federal courts in the first instance. Hawk maintained he had been
convicted of murder without effective representation by counsel and that perjured
evidence had been used against him with the connivance of the prosecutor. The
state Supreme Court had refused relief, on the ground that application should
have been made to a lower state court; various lower federal courts had also refused
to act. The Supreme Court, in 1944, upheld their refusal on the ground that
Hawk had not exhausted his remedies in the state courts. After an attempt to do
just this failed, the Supreme Court ruled that the state courts should have given
Hawk a hearing. But the state court still refused to grant a hearing, this time on the
ground that Hawk had mistaken his remedy-he should have used the writ of
coram nobis, not the writ of habeas corpus.28 When he then applied to a federal
o Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309 (1915), Holmes and Hughes, dissenting.
" See OsMOND K. FRAENKEL, THE SACCO-VAN-ZETT CASE 178-182 (1931).
2 2 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923).
"
5 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938). Actually the point first arose in a state case, the first
of the Scottsboro appeals, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
2 From Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (942) to Foster v. Illinois, 67 Sup. Ct. I76 '(1947).
" As in De Meerler v. Michigan, 329 U. S. 663 (1947). Marino v. Ragen, 68 Sup. Ct. 240 (U. S.
1947).
" Direct recourse to a federal court was allowed in House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42 (945), since state
remedies had been exhlausted. But the court ruled against petitioner on the facts: 63 F. Supp. 169
(S. D. Fla. 1945), a1fd, 351 Fed. X034 (C. C. A. 5 th 1945), cert. denied, 327 U. S. 834 (1946).
See also Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F. 2d 335 (C. C. A. 6th 3938); Potter v. Dowd, 346 F. 2d 244 (C. C. A.
7th 1944). United States ex rel. Rooney v. Ragen, 358 F. 2d 346 (C. C. A. 7th x946), cert. denied,
331 U. S. 842 (947).
"sEx parze Hawk, 321 U. S. 134 (1944); Hawk v. Olsonr, 326 U. S. 271 (945).
s The essential differences are: the writ coram nobis can be granted only by the court in which the
conmiotion was had; in some states itmust be asked for within a limited time; it is often not appealable.
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court, he was met by the contention that he had not yet exhausted his state rem-
dies.29 And the Hawk case is not unique, for in many states it is not clear what
remedy exists for challenging convictions of this kind.3 0
A particularly glaring instance of the consequence of the rule requiring exhaus-
tion of state remedies was the Mooney case. Years after his conviction in California
for murder, Mooney asserted that the chief witness against him was a perjurer,
suborned by the district attorney. After he unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas
corpus in a lower federal court, the Supreme Court held that there was merit in his
contentions and that the use of testimony known to be false was a denial of due
process?' But it ruled also that Mooney must seek redress in the state courts.
Accordingly, it was the California court which passed on the factual issue under-
lying Mooney's case, and, as was to be expected, that issue was decided against him
at the hearing. On appeal, the California Supreme Court accepted the result with
but one dissent, and this time the United States Supreme Court refused to inter-
fere.32 Justice for Mooney was left to belated executive clemency.
As it now stands, the rule that application must first be made to the state courts
in effect destroys the right to apply to the lower federal courts at all. If the state
court grants a hearing and decides the facts against the contention of the convicted
man, no other court is likely to review this determination or grant another hearing.
If the state court refuses a hearing on the ground the claim made by the accused
raises no constitutional issue and the Supreme Court refuses to review on certiorari,
it is pretty certain no lower federal court will thereafter grant relief and most un-
likely that the Supreme Court will then take the case.3 It is only where the state
court confesses itself powerless urder state procedure to grant relief that direct
application to the federal court is possible34 This is seldom likely to happen; hence
the right to apply to a lower federal court has become an illusory one.
Further, since the state courts are allowed to pass upon the factual issues, the
chance of real relief to a person who contends that state officials have misconducted
On the other hand this writ is not limited to cases in which the aggrieved person is in custody. See
Gayes v. New York, 67 Sup. Ct. 1711 (1947); Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U. S. 211 (1946).
" Hawk v. Olson, 66 F. Supp. 195 (D. Nebr. 1946).
30 In New York, for instance, this uncertainty was only recently cleared up. See People ex rel.
Wachowitz v. Martin, 293 N. Y. 361 (1944); Matter of Hogan, 295 N. Y. 92 (1946). The unsatis-
factory situation which for a long time has existed in Illinois is discussed by Mr. Justice Rutledge, con-
curring, in Marino v. Ragen, 68 Sup. Ct. 240, 241 (U. S. 1947).
at Mooney v. Holahan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935).3 Mooney v. Smith, io Cal. 2d 1, 73 P. 2d 554 (x937); id. 305 U. S. 598 (x938).
"Such a case was Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 163 F. 2d 498 (C. C. A. 4th 1947) (Cf. United States cx
rel Monsky v. Warden of Clinton State Prison, 163 F. 2d 978 (C. C. A. 2d 1947)); and it has been held
that state remedies have not been exhausted until review by the United States Supreme Court has been
sought, Gordon v. Scudder, 163 F. 2d 518 (C. C. A. 9 th 1947).
"As to Florida, see House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42 (945); as to Indiana, see Potter v. Dowd, 147
F. 2d 244 (C. C. A. 7th 1944). In White v. Regan, 324 U. S. 760 (1945), the Court pointed out that
application for certiorari is not a prerequisite to recourse to a lower federal court where the state
court decision might have rested on a non-federal ground. But as to when state remedies have not been
exhausted see also Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U. S. 211 (1946).
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themselves is likewise illusory. It is too much to expect wholly impartial justice
when one state official sits in judgment on another. Therefore, in situations like
this, the determination of the factual issue by a federal authority seems likelier to be
fair. Congress should change the existing rule so as to permit application to a
federal court in the first instance when a claim is made that a federal right has
been denied by improper action of state officials, whether prosecutors or judges.
In this respect the proposed revision of the Judicial Code, which has already
passed the House of Representatives, is defective. It proposes that application to a
federal court may be made in the first instance only where there is no "adequate!'
remedy available in state courts, or where state courts have denied a fair adjudication.
That formulation has been criticized also on the ground that the use of the
word "adequate" is likely to produce further litigation and uncertainty in the field.
Suggestions have come in to the effect that the words of the Johnson Act,"6 which
deals with injunctions against state rate schedules, be employed here, namely:
"plain, speedy and efficient." Surely if doubt exists regarding what remedy the
state courts offer, relief should be had in the first instance in a federal court. It
should no longer be possible to buffet a litigant like Hawk from one court to an-
other because no one seems quite sure where the proper remedy for him lies.
INTERFERENcE WITH STATE AcTION
The most frequent instances of federal jurisdiction are attempts to prevent state7
authorities from carrying out certain announced policies. In some cases- this in-
volves enjoining criminal prosecutions; in others, it may involve suits for declaratory
judgment with regard to the meaning of a state law.
Where no particular problem exists concerning the meaning of the state law,
federal jurisdiction is plain. This was the basis on which the Witnesses of Jehovah
successfully sought to enjoin the enforcement by school authorities, in various parts
of the country, of their requirement that all children participate in flag salute cere-
monies or be expelled.37 Lower federal courts have permitted injunction suits
under a variety of other circumstances. Thus a suit was sustained which sought
to prevent segregation of Mexican children in California schools, even though the
acts of the authorities were held to be contrary to state law.& Suits have also been
successfully brought to correct discriminations in teachers' salaries due to their race.?'
On the other hand, recourse to federal courts has been denied when the relief sought
has been purely political-such as to restrain state officers from arranging for an
election under districting challenged as violating the Constitution.4
3 H. R. 3214, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. (1947).
ae 48 STAT. 775 (1934), amending 28 U. S. C. §41(1). See Driscoll v. Edison Co., 307 U. S. 104
(3939).
" Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (940); Barnette v. West Virginia State
Board of Education, 319 U. S. 624 (943).
: Westminster School Dist. v. Mendez, x6i F. 2d 774 (C. C. A. 9th 1947).
'n Alston v. School Board, 112 F. 2d 992 (C. C. A. 4 th 1940); Thompson v. Gibbes, 6o F. Supp.
872 (E. D. S. C. 1945).
'0Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549 (1946); cf. Blackman v. Stone, zor F. 2d 500 (C. C. A. 7th
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When, however, the meaning of the state statute involved is unclear, particularly
when attempts are made immediately upon passage to prevent its enforcement, the
situation alters. In such cases as these the Supreme Court has imposed the limitation
that the state court should be given a chance to limit its application so as, perhaps,
to avoid any infringement of constitutional right.
This rule, well established in cases involving ordinary property rights, was given
definite application to civil liberties in a case involving the Witnesses of Jehovah.
Many municipalities had attempted to restrict the activities of this sect on the public
streets, by applying ordinances restricting distribution of leaflets and by requiring
license fees in connection with distribution. The Supreme Court had made numer-
ous rulings for Jehovah's Witnesses in direct review of convictions for violating these
types of ordinances. 41  In one situation, however, the witnesses sought to prevent
prosecution by suit for injunction. In Douglas v. Jeannette,4  a unanimous Supreme
Court held this might not be done. Chief Justice Stone stated that a federal court
should not attempt in advance to pass on the various issues which might arise. He
pointed out that relief by injunction had been allowed in the CIO's case against
Mayor Hague of Jersey City4" because, in that case, local officials forcibly broke up
meetings and deported participants from the state, without instituting legal pro-
ceedings in which those affected could have challenged te constitutionality of the
acts they complained of.
The same rule was applied in a case instituted by the American Federation of
Labor to challenge an amendment to the Florida Constitution outlawing the closed
shop. In that case, 4 however, the majority of the Supreme Court reached the con-
clusion that the federal court should retain jurisdiction of the action until the
Florida courts had interpreted the constitutional provision. Why jurisdiction was
retained fiere but was not in the case of the Witnesses of Jehovah does not become
altogether clear in the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, although he does refer to the
fact that proceedings were threatened against a large number of unions. The dis-
tinction seemed insufficient to the Chief Justice, who considered the two cases alike
and believed the suit should haive been dismissed. On the other hand, Justice
Murphy thought the issue was so clear that it should have been passed upon by the
federal court without awaiting action by the state.
The rule remains the same though the application be for declaratory judgment
1939); Cook v. Fortson, 329 U. S. 675 (1946). Original jurisdiction in these cases was in is special
three judge court under 28 U. S. C. §380 (1940), because state statutes, not merely municipal ordinances,
were being attacked.
"
1Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U. S. 147 (1939); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 3x9 U. S. 1o5 (1943).
42319 U. S. 157 (1943)- "Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U. S. 496 (x939).
" A. F. of L. v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582 (946). Original jurisdiction in this case wis in a special
three judge court under 28 U. S. C. §380 (1940), because a state statute, not merely a municipal ordi-
nance, was being attacked. See also Traffic Telephone Workers' Federation of New Jersey v. Driscoll,
72 F. Supp. 499 (D. N. J. 1947), appeal dismissed, Justices Black and Reed dissenting, 68 Sup. Ct. 221
(U. S. 1947). There a state suit was brought as contemplated under Section 380 and the federal suit
stayed to await the outcome of the state suit.
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rather than an injunction. Thus, the Supreme Court refused to pass on the merits
of challenges by labor organizations against an Alabama statute regulating their
activities.4 While the suits in those cases had been instituted in the state courts,
the Supreme Court made it plain that the same rule would apply to such a suit
brought in the federal courts.
It seems clear, therefore, that the federal courts can be used to protect consti-
tutional rights only after a doubtful state statite has been defined by the highest
state court. Here again the restriction has made the direct appeal to the federal
courts largely fruitless. Normally, the way to review the decision of the state court
denying a claimed federal right would be to seek direct review of that decision in
the United States Supreme Court. There are, of course, circumstances under which
perhaps the federal courts might take jurisdiction at the behest of someone who had
not been a party to the earlier proceedings. And however restrictive the present rule
may be, it is not open to serious objection, because the state court is being called upon
to interpret its own statute, not to pass on contested facts. If the interpretation of the
statute is such as to prevent denial of federal right then no harm has been done; if
the opposite result is reached the question still remains open for the United States
Supreme Court to pass on.
DAmAGE Surfs
Since an action at law for damages does not seek to compel future action or to
undo the past, it is not subject to any of the restrictions we have been discussing. The
question to be determined in such a suit is whether the act complained of violated
a f ederal right. This involves deciding whether the act took place and whether, if it
did, a federal right was infringed-an issue of fact and one of law. It is the federal
court which determines both questions.
In order to get into the federal court it is, of course, necessary to comply with
the jurisdictional requirements of the federal Judicial Code. Either the amount
claimed must exceed $3,000 or the case must present one of those special situations
in which no jurisdictional amount is required: i., it must arise out of a conspiracy
to deny equal rights or it must concern an act committed under "color" of state law
or custom.46
What constitutes such "color" has given rise to much controversy.. The law on
the subject has been defined chiefly in criminal cases, but is, of course, equally appli-
cable to civil actions for damages. The Supreme Court has definitely ruled that
an act is done under color of state law even though not authorized by state law, so
"A. F. of L. v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 450 (11945); C. I. 0. v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 472 (i945); c4.
Hill v. Florida, 325 ET. S. 538 (1945). Suits for declaratory judgment were allowed, however, in con-
nection with claims for the right to vote in primaries, Ellmore v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516 (E. D.-S. C.
1947), and in connection with right to a legal education: Wrighten v. Board of Trustees, 72 F. Supp.
945 (E. D. S. C. 1947). Basis for the latter case was of course Missouri ex tel. Gaines v. Canada,
305 U. S. 337 (1938), although that was an application for a mandamus, and basis for the former was
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944), although that was an action for damages.
"'See 36 STAT. 1092 (1911), as amended, 28 U. S. C. §41(2), (13), (14) (1940).
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long as it is done by state officials purporting to act pursuant to authority given
them by law 47
Damage suits, of course, have been brought in a great variety of circumstances.
The courts have upheld actions of this kind brought for denial of the right to vote
for federal office 4s and also for conspiracy to deny the equal protection of the
laws,49 but not to deny due process50
The Supreme Court was recently confronted with the problem whether or not a
suit for damages could be brought for unlawful search and seizure.r1 While, in the
particular case, the suit was against federal officials, the same problem might arise
concerning state officials. Here the majority of the Supreme Court did not finally
pass on the question, but merely ruled that the District Court had jurisdiction to
determine it. Chief Justice Stone and Justice Burton believed no right to bring
stit existed, since neither the constitutional provision nor any act of Congress
afforded a remedy to the person whose rights had been invaded.
The lower federal courts have upheld their jurisdiction in a number of interesting
situations. In one case a school teacher sued his principal on the ground that the
latter had improperly caused his discharge for absence from duty while serving on a
federal jury.52 In another, a Negro sued to recover damages because he had been
denied the right to training as a librarian in a school maintained by a municipality. r'3
Anda complaint was upheld which sought damages for unlawful arrest where it was
alleged that the arrest had been made under color of a state law affecting interstate
rendition.54
On the other hand, it was held that no basis existed for a suit alleging con-
spiracy to prevent employment in the WPA, because plaintiff had no "absolute right"
to such employment." Nor can a federal court entertain a suit for damages be-
cause of failure of state officers to certify the plaintiff as nominee in an election, there
being no property right involved.' Although a claim was made in that case that
the denial of certification was based on discrimination, the court rejected that claim
over the dissent of Justices Black and Douglas.
'
7 United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941); United States v. Screws, 325 U. S. 91 (1945).
"'Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1939); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U. S. 368 (r9'5).
' As in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944), for refusing Negroes the right to vote in a
primary.
"Mitchell v. Greenough, 1oo F. 2d 184 (C" C. A. 9th 1938), cert. denied, 3o6 U. S. 659 (1939).
But in Refoule v. Ellis, 74 F. Supp. 336 (N. D. Ga. 1947), the court granted a preliminary injunction to
restrain infringements of due process such as improper questioning to obtain a confession and harass-
ment by arrest without warrant.
"' Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678 (1946). Later thd District Court held that no cause of action existed
under federal law to recover damages because of an unlawful search and seizure, even when the wrong.
doers were federal officers. 71 F. Supp. 813 (S. D. Cal. 1947).
:2 Bomar v. Keyes, 16z F. 2d 136 (C. C. A. 2d 1947).
' Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F. 2d 212 (C. C. A. 4 th 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S.
721 (1945).
.'Picking v. Pennsylvania R. R., 151 F. 2d 240, 152 id. 753 (C. C. A. 3d 1945).
"Love v. Chandler, 124 F. 2d 785 (C. C. A. 8th 0942).
'Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1 (1944), cf. Shunders v. Wilkins, 152 F. 2d 235 (C. C. A. 4 th
1945), cert. denied, 328 U. S. 870 (946).
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In one respect the law might well be changed with regard to damage suits. There
seems no reason why vindication of constitutional rights in the federal courts should
depend upon the amount involved where civil liberties are at issue, whatever may be
the propriety of keeping small property claims out of these courts. Congress has
already recognized the soundness of this principle in certain sorts of civil liberties
cases. It should extend the right of direct resort to the federal courts to all civil
liberties cases arising out of the federal Constitution, regardless of the amount in
controversy.
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
In addition to the civil remedies open to aggrieved individuals themselves, there
is always the possibility that the aid of the prosecuting arm of the federal govern-
ment may be invoked. Since Attorney General Murphy set up a Civil Rights section
in the Department of Justice, action in this field has been coordinated. In conse-
quence there has been a considerable increase in the number and extent of federal
prosecutions. Unfortunately, the area within which these can be conducted is a
narrow one.
Federal prosecution for violation of civil rights rests, in the main, on laws enacted
to implement the post-Civil War amendments to the Constitution, the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth. The first of these laws was the Enforcement Act of
x87o.57 Although most of its provisions were repealed r 8 several sections still re-
main. One of these 9 punishes as a crime any conspiracy to deprive a citizen of
rights or privileges secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. While
this section protects only citizens and applies only to conspiracies, it is not limited
to action by state officers.Y0 Another provision still in effect 6' protects all persons
and is not restricted to conspiracies, but it can be invoked only when the accused
has acted under color of a state law or custom. The third provision also still in
existence6 2 punishes interference with the right to vote because of race or color.
Congress has also passed laws punishing peonage, which are applicable to private
persons as well as to state officials.
Since the Civil Rights Law does not specify what federally secured rights are
Z 1:6 STAT. 140 (1870), 36 STAT. i092 (i9ni), 28 U. S. C. §41(11) (1940).
Be 28 STAT. 36 (1894), 36 STATr. so96 (1911), as amended, 39 StAT.53" (1916), 28 U. S. C. §74
(1940), 35 STAT. 153 (1909), i8 U. S. C. §§572, 573 (1940).
s 35 STAT. 1092 (i9o9), 18 U. S. C. §51 (1940). See MILTON R. Ko-vwri, THE Comsnm-nov
AND CIVIL RIGHTS 28-47 (1947).
*United States v. Ellis, 43 F. Supp. 321 (W. D. S. C. 1942).
*1 35 STAT. 1092 (1909), 18 U. S. C. §52 (1940). See MLTo-. R. KOxVITZ, THE CoNs-Tnrnon
AND CIVIL " RXGm 47-73 (1947).
e"Rrv. STAT. §2004 (1875), 8 U. S. C. §31 (1940).
e'Rav. STAT. §1990 (x875), 8 U. S. C. §56 (1940); 35 STAT. 1138 (1909), x8 U. S. C. §421 (1940).
e Pierce v. United States, 146 F. 2d 84 (C. C. A. 5th 1944), cert. denied, 324 U. S. 873 (1944).
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protected against interference, it was argued, in Screws v. United States,"" that the
law was too vague to be enforced. The majority of the Supreme Court ruled other-
wise. Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out that these rights had become defined by
successive decisions of the court. It had been settled that for a state officer to mal-
treat a person after his arrest was a denial of due process! 0 Therefore, any state
officer who committed such an act in the knowledge it was wrong could be punished.
But it was necessary to establish that the violation of right had been willful. The
majority, therefore, reversed the conviction, since they believed the jury had been
insufficiently instructed. Three of the justices (Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson)
thought that the indictment should have been dismissed altogether, both because
the statute was too vague and because the acts complained of had not been committed
under color of state law. Justices Rutledge and Murphy thought that the conviction
should have been affirmed, but Justice Rutledge concurred with the decision of the
four justices who thought there should be a new trial only because, otherwise, the
case would remain undisposed of. Both these justices maintained there could be
no doubt the state officials knew they had no right to do what they did. Mr. Justice
Murphy pointed out that the question of the sufficiency of the judge's charge had
not been raised in the lower courts and that there was no need for any explicit
charge on the subject of willfulness.
The effect of the majority decision has been unfortunate, because the stress on the
necessity for willful violation of constitutional rights makes it easy for a judge
unsympathetic to the the prosecution to induce a jury to acquit. This is what
actually happened on the retrial of the Screws case.
Existing law would be much improved by the simple enactment that all inter-
ferences with federally secured rights are criminal, replacing the present law which
condemns only those resulting from conspiracy and those carried out under color of
state law. This change would not, of course, be very far-reaching; but there is no
reason for not making it. Congress could also strengthen the present laws dealing
with the suffrage, particularly by making it an offense to interfere in any way with
presidential elections (to overcome a lower court's rulingo1 that existing laws do
not cover these). Specific legislation may also be desirable in order to broaden the
base for dealing with primary elections, a base now somewhat limited by the
Supreme Court in the Classic case 0
Congress might further use the commerce power both by prohibiting segregation
by interstate carriers and by prohibiting discrimination by labor unions or employ-
ers engaged in interstate commerce.
It has been suggested that it might be easier to obtain convictions if the Civil
as325 U.. S. 91 (x945)-
00Culp v. United States, 131 F. 2d 93 (C. C. A. 8th x942);. Catlette v. United States, 132 F. 2d
9o2 (C. C. A. 4 th 1943).
0T Walker v. United States, 93 F. 2d 383 (C. C. A. 8th x937), cert. denied, on appeal of defendants,
303 U. S. 655 (1938).
ea313 U. S. 299 (1941).
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Rights Law were amended so as to avoid the necessity of persuading juries that
the defendants have willfully sought to invade constitutional rights. This could be
accomplished in two ways: by simply deleting the word "willful" from the statute,
or by replacing the present law with a new one making it a crime to violate certain
specific rights. The opinions in the Screws case0 9 cast grave doubt upon the consti-
tutionality of the first proposal. The second would no doubt remove the argument
that the law is too vague to be enforceable, an argument which led the majority of
the Supreme Court to insist the offense must be a willful one. Such an amendment
would specify precisely those federally secured rights, interference with which would
constitute a crime. The suggestion is persuasive, but not, I think, sound. For,
while specific laws might produce more convictions for the particular offenses
described, necessarily there would be others left out, either because Congress had
not thought of them at the time or because of the difficulty of obtaining Con-
gresssional agreement that they should be included.
CONCLUSION
It should be borne in mind that modern experience shows us the courts are not
always the best instruments for securing civil rights. Even in relatively enlightened
states, such as New York, conventional methods of law enforcement by civil suit or
criminal prosecution have proved ineffective. And when the legislature of New
York decided to do something effective about discrimination in employment it used
the administrative procedure already found useful in the field of labor relations.
Congress may follow suit and create a permanent Fair Employment Practices Com-
mission. Later similar machinery may be established to deal with other areas of
discrimination, such as housing and education. Administrative methods may even
come to be applied to the elusive subject of restrictions on voting. In all these fields
action by administrative agencies should be much more effective than the hap-
hazard results obtainable from the privately maintained law suit.
If the shift to administrative action occurs in these large areas of civil liberties,
then the role of the lower federal courts as fact finders will diminish. Yet their
role as interpreters of the law and as guardians of fair procedure will always re-
main, subject, of course, to the final say of the Supreme Court. Indeed, in dealing
with questions of the procedure of state courts, the function of the lower federal
courts may even be increased if, as suggested, they are given power to pass on the
facts when a claim of wrongdoing by state officials is made. However their scope
be changed, they will continue to exercise an important function in assuring that
the states respect the provisions of the federal Constitution and the laws which pro-
tect the civil rights of the individual.
at325 U. S. 9! (x945)-
